ABSTRACTPrior research on attention bias in anxious youth, often utilising a visual dot probe task, has yielded inconsistent findings, which may be due to how bias is assessed and/or variability in the phenomenon. The present study utilises eye gaze tracking to assess attention bias in socially anxious adolescents, and explores several methodological and within-subject factors that may contribute to variability in attention bias. Attention bias to threat was measured in forty-two treatment-seeking adolescents diagnosed with Social Anxiety Disorder. Bias scores toward (...) emotional stimuli and bias scores away from emotional stimuli were explored. Bias scores changed between vigilance and avoidance within individuals and over the course of stimulus presentation. These differences were not associated with participant characteristics nor with self-reported social anxiety symptoms. However, clinician rated severity of social anxiety, explained a signific... (shrink)

The attempt by Arnason and Roberts to interpret Canetti’s work in the context of social theory is taken here as the point of departure to investigate Canetti’s view on the phenomenon of resistance. Resistance is explored in the context of Canetti’s reflection on power and transformation. Further, it is argued that through his substantive concern for crowds, an epistemological challenge emerges for social theory. Canetti gives us some precious insights on phenomena of ambiguous multiplicity, which are neither simple sums of (...) separate individuals nor an ontologized Durkheimian collective. Not only this, he resolutely ventures towards the contingency at the foundation of social order, the ‘just-thisness' of power, revealing its non-symbolic basis in gestures that impart affects. It is at this level that resistance can be best understood as a movement of liberation from the grip of power. (shrink)

À primeira vista, parece óbvia a mensagem contida no episódio em que o profeta Elias, ao fugir para o deserto, alcança o monte Horeb. Há os que percebem na narrativa uma clara referência a uma jornada interior, empreendida pelo profeta, com vistas à renovação de seu chamado ou mesmo como um retorno às fontes da fé. No entanto, a análise das estratégias de construção da narrativa pode levar ao propósito da mensagem conforme engendrada pelo narrador. O presente artigo consiste em (...) uma leitura de 1 Reis 19,1-21. O objetivo é questionar o texto a partir do instrumental oferecido pelo método da análise narrativa, com vistas a explicitar as estratégias escolhidas pelo narrador e seus efeitos sobre o leitor implícito, procurando não perder de vista as particularidades da narrativa bíblica. Além disto, pretende-se identificar o caminho que está proposto ao leitor atual, destacando a catequese envolvida na perícope. O medo na vida do fiel pode conduzi-lo para fora do lugar da obediência. No entanto, a intervenção divina acena a possibilidade de correção da rota assumida por pensamentos distorcidos acerca de si, de sua missão e de Deus. Palavras-chave: Profeta Elias. Narrativa bíblica. Análise narrativa.At first glance, the message contained the episode in which the prophet Elijah flees to the desert and reaches the Mount Horeb seems to be obvious. There are some who face the narrative as a clear reference to an inner journey undertaken by the Prophet in order to renew his call or return to the sources of faith. However, the analysis of narrative strategies can lead to the message purpose as designed by its narrator. This article presents a reading of 1 Ki 19,1-21. It aims to question the text by using the tools offered by narrative analysis method in order to highlight chosen strategies and their impact on implied reader, considering the particularities of biblical narrative. The goal is also to identify the path or catechesis proposed to the current reader. The presence of fear in the believer’s life can lead him astray from obedience place. Divine intervention, however, indicates the possibility of getting back on track believer’s distorted thoughts about himself, his mission and God. Keywords: Prophet Elijah. Biblical narrative. Narrative analysis. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze the mechanisms of empirical data collection in medicine and psychology in the early Enlightenment by means of experiment, observation and self-observation, while associating them with their discursive forms of representation; namely, the case narrative. The combination of empirical and discursive anthropo-techniques leads to explanations on the anthropoietics of the Enlightenment; i.e., the question of how the habitus of man was shaped around 1750. Texts of four German ‘reasonable physicians’ will be considered: Friedrich Hoffmann, Johann Gottlieb (...) Krüger, Andreas Elias Büchner and Johann August Unzer. (shrink)

The concept of truth arguably plays a central role in many areas of philosophical theorizing. Yet, what seems to be one of the most fundamental principles governing that concept, i.e. the equivalence between P and , is inconsistent in full classical logic, as shown by the semantic paradoxes. I propose a new solution to those paradoxes, based on a principled revision of classical logic. Technically, the key idea consists in the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the structural principle of (...) contraction. I first motivate philosophically this idea with the metaphysical picture of the states-of-affairs expressed by paradoxical sentences as being distinctively . I then proceed to demonstrate that the theory of truth resulting from this metaphysical picture is, in many philosophically interesting respects, surprisingly stronger than most other theories of truth endorsing the equivalence between P and (for example, the theory vindicates the validity of the traditional laws of excluded middle and of non-contradiction, and also vindicates the traditional constraint of truth preservation on logical consequence). I conclude by proving a cutelimination theorem that shows the consistency of the theory. (shrink)

The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...) that are best candidates for being luminous plays an illicit role in such argument. The paper centres around the idea that vagueness brings with itself the prima facie plausibility of soritical principles. Using the diagnostics of sharpenings, it is first pointed out that, despite certain considerations to the contrary, the margin‐for‐error principle required by the anti‐luminosity argument may well derive all of its plausibility from an underlying soritical principle. The notion of confidence that is relevant to the argument is then isolated and sharply distinguished from the notion of subjective probability. Against this background, it is argued that the reasoning about confidence involved in the argument in favour of the problematic margin‐for‐error principle is fallacious in the same way in which sorites reasoning is. This reveals the possibility of having reliable knowledge even at the penumbral limit with falsity, a possibility for which a concrete formal model is constructed. The model in turn permits a deeper appreciation of the role played in the dialectic by the distinction between confidence and subjective probability as well as by confidence requirements on knowledge. It is concluded that careful heeding of vagueness and its phenomena, far from forcing new and surprising limits on our knowledge, actually removes one of the main barriers – unreliability – often thought to stand in its way. (shrink)

In a series of works, Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij have proposed a nontransitive system (call it ‘_K__3__L__P_’) as a basis for a solution to the semantic paradoxes. I critically consider that proposal at three levels. At the level of the background logic, I present a conception of classical logic on which _K__3__L__P_ fails to vindicate classical logic not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of operational ones. At the level of (...) the theory of truth, I raise a cluster of philosophical difficulties for a _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive truth, all variously related to the fact that such a system proves things that would seem already by themselves repugnant, even in the absence of transitivity. At the level of the theory of validity, I consider an extension of the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity that is supposed to certify that validity in that system does not fall short of naive validity, argue that such an extension is untenable in that its nontriviality depends on the inadmissibility of a certain irresistible instance of transitivity (whence the advertised “final cut”) and conclude on this basis that the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity cannot coherently be adopted either. At all these levels, a crucial role is played by certain metaentailments and by the extra strength they afford over the corresponding entailments: on the one hand, such strength derives from considerations that would seem just as compelling in a general nontransitive framework, but, on the other hand, such strength wreaks havoc in the particular setting of _K__3__L__P_. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of authenticity that places special demands on (...) our moral beliefs. (shrink)

How can sound and space be connected not only in a metaphorical sense? Over the last decades, philosophy of sound, aesthetics, and musicology have shown increasing interest in space inquiry. However, the way we interact with each other, communicate in space, and gather information about/in space is rooted in sound in a completely different way from those of musical metaphors. In this paper, I present an analysis of the role sound plays in the constitution of both space and relations of (...) intimacy within it. Starting from the wealthy tips that E. T. Hall gives to us in order to delineate a new understanding of proxemics that includes sound experience, I argue that sound, silence, and noise are essential to determine the intimate space and the way we interact with it. Moving from a classical proxemics perspective, the analysis will focus on the intimate relation between sound, space, and body, dialoguing with phenomenology, anthropology, semiotics, and philosophy of space. (shrink)

In this paper we develop what we can describe as a “dual two-sided” cut-free sequent calculus system for the non-classical logics of truth lp, k3, stt and a non-reflexive logic ts which is, arguably, more elegant than the three-sided sequent calculus developed by Ripley for the same logics. Its elegance stems from how it employs more or less the standard sequent calculus rules for the various connectives and truth, and the fact that it offers a rather neat connection between derivable (...) sequents and validity in comparison to the calculus developed by Ripley. (shrink)

Art is whatever it is mediated through anticipations of diverse kinds. To the temporal art of music such anticipations are crucial. Composers and performers build up expectations in their musical works and interpretations, thwart them, delay their fulfillment, fulfill them. Some of these expectations arise on the level of chosen genre, others are peculiar to the individual composition. Listeners, correspondingly, may adjust their expectations or, alternatively, attempt to uphold them at any price, turning them into prejudices. And, as anything in (...) art, musical anticipations are prone to ambiguities; they may, e.g., be redeemed at a surface level while being countered subliminally. (shrink)

Let's get physical -- The metaphysics of physicalism -- Defining physicalism -- A physicalism with bite -- The explanatory gap and consciousness -- Ignorance and knowledge -- The psychological turn.

For the last two centuries “Vom Kriege” has been used to justify two different kinds of totalitarianisms: Marxism-Leninism and Nazism. However, during the 1950s liberal thinking also made use of that work. In line with liberal thinking, Raymond Aron’s “Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz” presents Clausewitz’s work as moderate and liberal and underplays its totalitarian connections.

The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive (...) justice. One prominent theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, assesses distributions as just if, and only if, people's relative positions reflect their exercises of responsibility. There is a principled luck egalitarian case for giving lower priority to those who are responsible for their need. Compared to the existing literature favouring such differentiation, luck egalitarianism provides a clearer rationale of fairness, acknowledges the need for individual assessments of responsibility, and requires initiatives both inside and outside of the allocation systems aimed at mitigating the influence from social circumstances. Furthermore, the concrete policies that luck egalitarians can recommend are neither too harsh on those who make imprudent choices nor excessively intrusive towards those whose exercises of responsibility are assessed. (shrink)

The imperative to practice hospitality constitutes a mark of Western civilization. Already in Homer’s Odyssey, the hero Ulysses punishes Polyphemus for not having respected the obligation of hospitality towards him and his companions. In fact, hospitality has been a constitutive element of the West, marked by linguistic, cultural, and religious differences, in a world whose borders are supposed to be well defined. In his discussion of hospitality, Derrida shows how Socrates, in Plato’s dialogue The Apology of Socrates, places himself in (...) the position of a foreigner. In fact, Socrates presents himself as foreigner, that is, someone who is alien to the language and procedures of the court that is judging him. According to Derrida, he shows, in this way, the extent to which the foreigner is forced to ask for hospitality in a language he does not know. The court reduces Socrates to the other, the different. Moreover, the court forces him to deny his difference, his own identity, asking him to adapt himself to a system that he does not control. The paradox arises when Socrates, who regrets being regarded as a foreigner, asks the court to treat him at least as a foreigner. He feels so outraged that he asks to be granted at least the rights of a non-national. In doing so, Socrates shows how recognizing the rights of the foreigner generates hospitality but, at the same time, also limits it. Whenever a human being is recognized as human being, he or she will necessarily be seen as another, as someone different. This person will have to adapt him or herself to a system, culture or world that will define him or her as a foreigner. In short, in the phenomena that we tend to see as hospitality there is always a certain hostility. In a world of ongoing migratory crises, and in the context of a return to nationalisms of exclusion combined with populisms of prejudice and aversion to those who are different, it becomes imperative to rethink the ethics and politics of hospitality. In this context, Derrida’s distinction between conditioned and unconditioned hospitality can be useful. (shrink)

Freedom is one of the central values in political and moral philosophy. A number of theorists hold that freedom should either be the only or at least one of the central distribuenda in our theories of distributive justice. Moreover, many follow Mill and hold that a concern for personal freedom should guide, and limit, how paternalist public policy can be. For the most part, theorists have focussed on a person’s freedom at one specific point in time but have failed to (...) give proper attention to freedom across time. Given that we care about personal freedom now, we have reason to care about future freedom too. But what kind of distribution of freedom across a person’s lifetime should we promote as a matter of legislation and public policy? I argue that none of the candidate principles for the distribution of freedom across time is plausible. Neither a starting gate view, nor a maximisation nor a sufficientarian view is satisfactory, because none adequately reflects our various reasons to value freedom. I show that this result presents a tough challenge for theories of distributive justice and paternalism that set great store by personal freedom. (shrink)

In this paper we focus mainly on a kind of contextualism theory of vagueness according to which the context dependence has its source in the variation of our practical interests. We largely focus on Fara's version of the theory but our observations work at different levels of generality, some relevant only to the specifics of Fara's theory others relevant to all contextualist theories of a certain type.

Die Beiträge des Bandes unterziehen Hegels 'Phänomenologie des Geistes' nicht vorrangig einer erneuten historischen und philologisch-hermeneutischen Interpretation. Sie lesen Hegels Frühwerk vielmehr primär kritisch aus der Erfahrung seiner Nachgeschichte und systematisch aus der Perspektive gegenwärtiger Philosophien. Das von den Autoren behandelte Spektrum reicht von der Anthropologie seit Ludwig Feuerbach über den symbolphilosophischen Ansatz Ernst Cassirers bis zu an Michel Foucault und Jacques Lacan orientierten Lesarten des Herr-Knecht-Kapitels. Mit Beiträgen von: Andreas Arndt, Wolfgang Bergande, Harald Bluhm, Brady Bowman, Veit Friemert, (...) Christian Iber, Walter Jaeschke, Reinhard Mehring, Christian Möckel, Patience Moll, Ernst Müller, Erzsébet Rózsa, Christine Weckwerth u.a. (shrink)

Dies ist der erste Teil einer zweibändigen Studie zur Genese unseres heutigen, vom Anspruch her den chronologischen Verlauf der gesamten Menschheitsgeschichte strukturierenden „Epochen“-Systems. Der Band skizziert zunächst die geistesgeschichtlichen Prämissen. Von der rudimentären paläolithischen Zeiteinteilung führt er über die ältesten schriftlich dokumentierten Ordnungsversuche in den sumerischen bzw. ägyptischen „Königlisten“, griechische und römische Autoren, Petrarca, Bruni und Vasari bis zu Cellarius, der am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts die Drei-Zeitalter-Distinktion „Antike-Mittelalter-Neuzeit“ zum zentralen chronologischen Gliederungsprinzip der Weltgeschichte erhob. Anschließend stehen die drei klassischen, (...) von Pyrrhon, Polybios bzw. Ptolemaios entwickelten „Epoché“-Konzepte sowie deren Auftauchen und Rezeption im lateinischen Europa im Fokus. Sodann wird die erstaunlich spät, nämlich erst nach Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts einsetzende Transformation der „Epoché“ zur fundamentalen historiographischen Ordnungskategorie thematisiert. Schließlich verfolgen wir anhand zahlreicher Autoren sowie der kontemporären Lexikographie ihren auf Latein wie in den relevanten europäischen „Volkssprachen“ (Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch, Spanisch, Portugiesisch, Italienisch) stattfindenden Divulgationsprozeß. Dabei erweist sich der Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts erneut als Wasserscheide. Der erste Band endet deshalb an dieser Stelle, der zweite wird dann die weitere Entwicklung von 1700 bis zur Gegenwart analysieren. This is the first part of a two-volume study of the genesis of our modern-day system of epochs, which claims to structure the chronology of the entire history of mankind. The volume sets out by sketching the intellectual premises. It leads from the rudimentary Palaeolithic division of time via the oldest attempts at structuring to have been documented in written form, through to the Sumerian and Egyptian “King Lists”, to Greek and Roman authors, to Petrarch, Bruni, and Vasari, and finally to Cellarius, who in the late 17th century introduced the distinction between the three epochs of “Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Modern Era” as the basic chronological principle of organising the history of the world. This is followed by a closer look at the three classical concepts of “Epoché” as defined by Pyrrhon, Polybios and Ptolemaios, respectively, as well as their surfacing and reception in Latin Europe. Not until the second half of the 16th century, which is an astonishingly late point in time, can the transformation of “Epoché” into a fundamental category of historiographic structuring be detected. Finally, by studying numerous writers as well as the contemporary lexicography, we will outline the process of divulgation that took place both in Latin as well as in the relevant European “vernaculars” (English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian). In the process, the late 17th century again proves to be a kind of divide. As a consequence, volume one ends here; a second volume (forthc.) will analyse the further development to the present day. (shrink)